One man that has a mind and knows it can always beat ten men who haven't and don't.
-George Bernard Shaw, The Apple Cart We have known for ages, and it is true in ever so many ways. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to yet another, perhaps more surprising respect in which that is also true: organizing can be a way of overcoming a certain sort of false consciousness itself. 2 Traditional organizing aims at producing concerted action. In the present application, the aim of organizing is to produce correct beliefs -1 For purposes of this paper, Masses are distinguished from Elites by two simple features: they are more numerous; and they are less probable to be correct in judging their own objectively true interests.
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'False consciousness' means harboring objectively false beliefs about what is in one's own true interests. The strategy sketched in this paper will help people overcome such false beliefs just so long as the false consciousness is not too prevalent, specifically, so long as it does not simultaneously affect half or more of the people in the group sharing the same interests. specifically, correct beliefs about our true interests. Traditionally, false perceptions of our interests are seen as an impediment to collective action. In the present context, awareness that our perceptions of our interests may be false serves as an impetus for us to collectivize -specifically, to pool our information. 3 Elites are advantaged in ever so many ways. In addition to having more power and wealth, they also have more information -most especially, information about what is truly in their interests and how to promote them.
By organizing, the Masses can overcome those advantages. They do so by pooling, not only their power and wealth (in all the traditional ways), but also (the novel suggestion of this paper) their information about what is in their interests and how to promote them.
We dub this strategy of pooling information with selected others 'epistemic solidarity'. The strategy works only within limits. First, people have to be relatively confident with whom they share the same interests, even if they are unsure exactly what those interests are. Second, the people in the group thus identified have to be more likely to be right than random 3 The further 'collective action' in view in this paper is voting together as a bloc with others who share the same objectives interests.
regarding the content of those interests. 4 Third, the less competent Masses must be more numerous than the more competent Elites. How much is required in each dimension is a function of how much is present in both of the other dimensions. We explore the qualitative relations between these three dimensions with the help of numerical examples. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the precise numbers are much less important than the systematic relations we discover.
What makes the trick of epistemic solidarity work is a phenomenon familiar from discussions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). That theorem says, roughly, that a majority among a group of voters, each of whom is more likely to be right than random, is more likely to be correct than is the individual voter; and the larger the number of voters, the more likely is a correct majority vote (that probability approaching certainty as the number of voters approaches infinity).
Here is one way of stating the theorem more precisely. 5 Assume a decision between two alternatives and a majority decision (without abstentions) in a population of odd size N. Let the state (of the world) be the 4 Both of which are to say: false consciousness must not run too deep. 5 Cf. Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983; List and Goodin 2001. fact which of the two alternatives is objectively correct. Two core assumptions are necessary for Condorcet's jury theorem to hold:
Competence. All voters have the same probability 1 > p > ½ to vote for the correct alternative (and this is true for both states).
Independence. The votes are independent, conditional on the state.
The theorem can then be stated as follows:
Condorcet Jury Theorem. Given Competence and Independence, the probability of a correct majority decision increases in (odd) group size and approaches 1 as N goes to infinity.
The present application alters that traditional framework by respecifying what voters are right about, that is, the state. In the classic framework, the state is taken to be some truth about the world that is the same for everyone (how many jellybeans there are in the jar, or whether kissing transmits HIV, or what is 'the common good' for us all). In the current application, we abjure notions of 'the common good' and focus instead upon group-specific criteria of 'what is truly good for us', which differs from one group to another. 6 This means that the state is now group-specific.
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The CJT can still be applied -only for each group separately. Provided that the standard CJT conditions hold, a majority vote among members of each group is more likely to be correct than is an individual member about what is truly in her and her group's interest. Furthermore, that effect will be stronger the larger the group -which is of course precisely the advantage that the Masses enjoy over the Elites in availing themselves of this strategy.
The upshot of this paper will be that the Masses can pretty well count on winning, just so long as they practice epistemic solidarity and they have sufficiently independent and competent opinions to pool. There are some settings in which that will not be true, despite independence and 6 Even if there is such a thing as 'the common good', as distinct from any 'group-specific interests', what is good for the largest number of people (ex hypothesi, the Masses) is likely often -if not invariably -to be what is in 'the common good' as well. The idea of a group-specific truth goes back to Alvin Goldman (1999, ch. 10) .
For a theorem in that regard, see List and Spiekermann, ms.. competence. 8 But these settings are sufficiently extreme to be of little practical consequence.
Epistemic solidarity is a game that two can play, however.
Furthermore, the Elites might well be better at playing it than the Masses. If the Elites succeed in practicing epistemic solidarity and the Masses do not 9 then smaller and individually more competent Elites can sometimes prevail over Masses who are more numerous but individually less competent. While that outcome will not always occur, it will in some scenarios that are sufficiently credible to be a real cause for concern.
The Effects of Sheer Numbers Alone
To some extent, the Masses can win through sheer force of numbers alone, even without practicing epistemic solidarity. They can afford more of their own to vote incorrectly, precisely because they have numbers to spare. Let us 8 Where the Elites are almost as big as the Masses, for example, and/or are vastly more competent than them (while Mass competence is just over random).
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Or do so only very badly. For how bad the Masses have to be at pooling for this to occur, see the discussion below. start by investigating the chances of the Masses winning in that baseline case, without any epistemic solidarity.
Suppose there are two groups in society, the Elites and the Masses.
Suppose that the policy that is truly in the interests of each member of the Elites is E and of each member of the Masses is M, and those are the only two options. Suppose that there are E Elite voters, each of whom is pe likely to vote correctly from his point of view (i.e., for E); and suppose that there are M Mass voters, each of whom is pm likely to vote correctly from his point of view (i.e., for M). The total size of the population is N = E + M.
Imagine now a direct referendum in which each voter votes sincerely and independently of one another (conditional on the correct answer for their group). And suppose that not only the electorate as a whole but also each subgroup E and M are large, so that the 'law of large numbers' applies. Then, as the population size goes to infinity while keeping the ratio E:M fixed, the proportion of votes for E in the total population would approach the Overcoming those limits is where the strategy of epistemic solidarity comes into play.
Epistemic Solidarity: Masses against Elites
Suppose that all members of the Masses can recognize one another perfectly.
Suppose that all members of the Masses make a pact, to which they all adhere perfectly, to vote the same way in the election. Suppose that they determine which way that will be by a majority vote in a pre-election ballot among the The literature on strategic voting tells us that sincere voting is not necessarily (or even typically) a Nash equilibrium. Then again, universal strategic voting is often not a Nash equilibrium either.
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Typically the Nash equilibria that do exist are not easily understood or anticipated, and hence not very likely to emerge among boundedly rational actors who have limited time, attention, information and cognitive capacities.
In the classic Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) set-up, if everyone votes strategically then nothing can be learned from the assumption that one's vote is pivotal -in the worst case, no one takes into account any private information.
But even if strategic Nash equilibria are practically unlikely to emerge, one may wonder whether it is plausible that seemingly out-of-equilibrium sincere voting is behaviorally stable. We argue that it will be. The voting game being played will typically be such that sincere voting is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium because of the combination of two facts: insincerity is punished;
and the incentives for strategic voting are small.
To see the first, note that the very idea of epistemic solidarity presupposes truthful revelation of one's private signal in the pre-election ballot. Given the purpose for which the Masses institute the pre-election ballot, a strong norm of sincere, non-strategic voting in the pre-ballot is likely to emerge; and those who are seen to deviate from that norm are likely to suffer social sanctions, if only reputational damage. Even if votes are secret and unobservable, the costs in terms of negative self-image or the costs of pretending to have voted sincerely can tip the balance. To see the second fact, note that the chances of any particular vote being decisive among a large group are small, and the incentives for strategic voting based on pivotality considerations are therefore limited. It is exceedingly unlikely you will be the pivotal voter in large populations, which results in a small expected gain from strategic voting. By contrast, the threat of sanctions to ensure truthtelling in the pre-election ballot can be powerful, and is likely to outweigh the strategic incentives. Taking these factors into account, it is plausible that sincere voting is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
In the limiting case (where the size of the Masses approaches infinity),
we can be completely confident that the pre-election ballot among the Masses will indicate where the true interests of the Masses lie, assuming the CJT assumptions (including no, or at least not too much, strategic voting) are met.
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Since the probability that the majority is correct increases rapidly with the number of voters for any competence level much above ½, this result approximately obtains even among much smaller groups. Table 2 displays the probability that the majority vote among groups numbering between 40
and 100 members will be correct, for varying levels of individual competence.
There we see, for example, that even for a group numbering merely 100, if the individual competence of members of that group is pm = 0.55 the probability that a majority among them is correct is 0.841.
Most importantly, that the voters are independent conditional on the state.
Neither the convergence to 1 nor the monotonic increase of group competence in group size necessarily obtains once the independence condition is weakened. See Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013) for a discussion and a theorem in that regard.
Suppose now that all members of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity, by voting in the election for whatever option won the pre-election ballot among their group. Then, as long as the Masses' pre-election ballot succeeds in correctly picking M (which we have just seen is very likely, even among relatively modest-sized groups), the Masses' preferred alternative is highly likely to win in the subsequent election. At the limit, with population size going towards infinity while keeping the ratio E:M fixed, the proportion of votes for M (the position in the true interest of the Masses) will be [M + (1 -pe)E]/N and the proportion of votes for E will be peE/N. Since, ex hypothesi, M > E, the position of the Masses would prevail comfortably.
Thus, the practice of epistemic solidarity can be a powerful tool in the hands of the Masses. But in one way, it might look like a tool of strictly limited utility. Not only does its use presuppose that both competence and independence assumptions hold. Furthermore, it is only within a fairly narrow range of values of pm that the tool will at one and the same time both work and be needed. It will work only where pm > 0.5 (with competence below 0.5 the theorem's optimistic conclusions no longer follow). And it is needed only where the Masses would not win by the force of numbers alone, which at the limit is where pm > (E/M)(pe -½) + ½. In the example sketched above (where pe = 0.7 and E/M = 0.20) that value would be pm < 0.54. In that example, therefore, the Masses both need and stand to benefit from epistemic solidarity only within a relatively narrow range 0.50 < pm < 0.54. Still, many real world cases may well fall within that window -which is to say, the Masses might often be better than random, but not by much.
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In addition, it is worth noting the magnitude of the contribution that epistemic solidarity can make among smaller populations to the probability of a victory for the position in the interests of the Masses. Table 3 We emphasize that this is purely an a priori speculation: we do not attempt to adduce any direct evidence on just how competent Masses actually are in judging their own true interests.
[ Masses. Take the case of pm = 0.51 and pe = 0.8. Without epistemic solidarity M has almost no chance of winning (the likelihood of that is only 16%), whereas with the Masses practicing epistemic solidarity that likelihood jumps to 58%
again.
Next take a case where epistemic solidarity is not strictly needed, in the sense that the position most in the interest of the Masses is likely to win anyway. Consider for example the cell in Table 3 where pm = 0.55 and pe = 0.70.
Even if the Masses do not practice epistemic solidarity, M is 56% likely to win.
But if they do, that likelihood jumps to 84%. Politically, that is a huge difference -the difference between a close-run thing and a virtual certainty.
So even in these sorts of cases, the Masses can benefit greatly from practicing epistemic solidarity, even in relatively small-group settings.
Whether the Masses can actually succeed in this epistemic collective action with a perfect success rate is an open question. Among other things, it would require a high degree of awareness about one's own position (a Marxist might say: 'class consciousness'). Elites might find its demands easier to satisfy, and we discuss in the next subsection the dangers posed by the strategy being implemented by them exclusively. Later in the paper we also investigate the effects of less than perfect 'class consciousness' by modeling imperfect group assortation.
Epistemic Solidarity: Elites Against Masses
Of course, either side or both could avail themselves of the strategy of epistemic solidarity. Conventionally, solidarity is most often discussed as a weapon of the weak, not least because they are in most need of it to overcome the strong. But solidarity may actually be practiced more easily among the strong, who are better networked and who thus find it easier to exchange information and coordinate their actions to ensure their interests are served.
For these practical reasons, epistemic solidarity (as opposed to other forms of solidarity, perhaps) may turn out to be a weapon more available to the Elites. For example, suppose, as before, M is five times the size of E, and suppose the Elites practice solidarity and the Masses do not. Then at the limit the option that is in the interests of the Elites, E, will prevail whenever pm < 0.6. Table 4 provides a few examples for smaller populations with the same group size and competence parameters as in Table 1 . As we see from Table 4 , even moderately small Elite groups practicing epistemic solidarity can seriously reduce the probability of a win for the option that is in the Masses'
interests. Take the case discussed above, in which the Elite has size E = 21
and individual competence pe = 0.7 and the Mass has size M = 100 and individual competence pm = 0.55. From Table 4 we see that, if the Elites practice epistemic solidarity while the Masses do not, the probability of M (the position in the true interest of the Masses) winning is only 16%. That compares to 56% probability of M winning when neither Elites nor Masses were practicing epistemic solidarity, as reported in Table 1 .
[ That may well be a challenge for the Masses in particular. If they are individually not very good at identifying what is in their interest, they may also find it difficult to know with whom they share the same interests. The
Sensitivity to Uncertainty Concerning Who Belongs in the Group
Elites, by contrast, may have a few aces up their sleeves: in addition to being more competent individually, they might be able to devote more efforts to finding out who is 'with them', they tend to 'know people who know', they are probably socially more mobile and better networked, and they often dominate the public discourse. All this helps the Elites to identify their own and to vote for their interests as a block. As we have seen, if the Masses remain divided while the Elites coordinate their votes, the Elites will often be able to impose their minority interests on the community as a whole.
So far we have been assuming that people have perfect information about who is in the group that shares the same interests as they do. If so, then the group with which they practice epistemic solidarity will contain all and only those with whom they share an interest. In the real world, however, there is bound to be some uncertainty surrounding who shares the same interests with them. Just how sensitive might our findings be to those uncertainties? Another theoretical possibility is to join a group and take part in their preballot, but then vote according to one's private signal. Note, however, that we assumed that once one has joined a pooling group voting in line with the preballot is institutionally required. Influencing the pre-ballot without following it is therefore not possible. This is a plausible restriction, as pooling groups would be likely to have strong norms (which people joining the group themselves internalize) against members who enter their vote in the preballot without following it. We have invoked precisely such a norm in our argument against strategic voting above.
of each cell in Table 3 against their own true interests. Thus, at the limit, M will defeat E if
which can be rearranged to
Thus, for example, if pm = 0.51 and pe = 0.7 and E and M are both large with E/M = 1/5, then M is expected to win so long as a little over 6% of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity and none of the Elites do.
Next suppose that both the Elites and the Masses practice epistemic solidarity, but some of each abstain from that practice on grounds they are subjectively too uncertain which is their own true group. Suppose once again that φMM out of the total M true members of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity; and now add to that the assumption that φEE out of the total E true members of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity (with 1 > φE > 0). Those not practicing epistemic solidarity vote on the basis of their individual perception of where their true interests lie, with accuracy of pm and pe for members of the Masses and Elites, as before.
By reasoning analogous to that underlying Equation 3, at the limit M is
That means that, in a similar scenario to the one just considered (pm = 0.51, pe = 0.7, E/M = 1/5) then if just half of the true members of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity, M is expected to win so long as more than about 12.2% of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity. Even if 80% of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity, all that is required is for more than about 15.9% of the Masses to do so in order to make an M victory more likely than not.
Inequalities 4 and 6 come in handy if we want to explore how sensitive our conclusions are to abstentions from epistemic solidarity. In our running example, as long as a non-negligible proportion of the Masses practice epistemic solidarity, the option in the Masses' true interests will win, and that is true within broad limits no matter how many of the Elites practice epistemic solidarity. This also becomes clear by looking at the large grey hatched bar when the Masses pool in Figure 1 : their pooled votes carry the Masses comfortably over the majority threshold, so that there is a lot of room for less pooling discipline without a change in outcome. However, different parameter values might put the result much more on a knife's edge, so that near universal pooling would be required.
Imperfect Assortation
A second possible response, tempting to those who are subjectively uncertain but perhaps not quite so uncertain or not quite so risk averse, is to practice epistemic solidarity with the group that they think is most likely to share their own interests -knowing that there is a risk they will get that assessment wrong, and end up practicing epistemic solidarity with the 'wrong' group, from their own point of view. The groups in which pooling takes place would then no longer be homogeneous, as they were (by stipulation) in the models discussed previously.
For the purpose of this model, assume that everyone knows that there are exactly two types of people in the population. One is the Mass type, the other is the Elite type, and just as before there are M of the former and E of the latter. Let us further assume that all Elite type individuals have the same probability pge > 0.5 of correctly identifying which type they are, while all
Mass type individuals have probability pgm > 0.5. Call this the 'group selection competence' of the Mass and Elite type, respectively. Let the population then be exhaustively partitioned into two groups, one composed of self-assessed members of the Masses and the other self-assessed members of the Elites.
Note that the sizes and compositions of these groups can vary, as they are the result of a stochastic assortation process.
Logically, there could be strategic considerations standing against the truthful revelation of one's perception of one's group type.
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But here we rule
A notable Nash equilibrium has all individuals end up in the same group with a pooling pre-ballot. Any unilateral deviation is unattractive, as the large pooling group always wins against one voter in the other group, while being out strategic considerations, in terms of group choice as well as pre-ballot voting. This is not purely for convenience of modeling. There may be good sociological reasons for people to reveal truthfully their perception of to which group they belong. They may have an expressive desire to join 'their own group' or, as before, a normative commitment to positively contribute to epistemic pooling within their own true group.
Finally, suppose that all Mass (respectively: Elite) type individuals have probability pm > ½ (pe > ½) of being correct in their personal assessment of their own interests in the case at hand, as before. We can explore this setup with computer simulations, investigating how the group selection competence influences the epistemic success of the Elites and Masses.
In Figure 2 , we plot the proportions of Mass majorities (relying on 1000 simulations for each data point) as a function of group selection competence, which for now we assume to be equal for both types, such that pgm = pge. The in the large groups provides a non-zero probability of being pivotal. In fact, if the larger group is a pooling group, being in the smaller group is dominated by being in the larger, winning group. This may be of some real-world interest: if individuals expect that one group will be larger and a pooling group, then this group is preferred if the individuals only care about getting their preferred result.
number of Elite types is 21 and of Mass types 100. The former have competence pe = 0.7 and the latter pm = 0.55. The circle markers show the probability of a Mass majority when only the self-assessed Elite group pools, the diamonds when only the self-assessed Mass group pools, and the stars when both groups pool.
[ Figure 2 about here]
We know from Table 4 that if the Elites and the Masses self-identify completely correctly and the Elites alone pool their votes, the probability of a Mass victory is 16%. This result is reflected in Figure 2 by the right-most circle marker: when group selection competence is 1, Mass majorities have a probability of about 16%. It is, prima facie, unsurprising that the Elites benefit from higher group selection competence when they are the only group pooling. By contrast, when the Masses or both groups pool votes, then the larger size of the self-assessed Mass group turns a higher group selection competence into an advantage for the Masses -the more homogeneous the pooling groups become, the more epistemically successful the Masses become in their pooling, outvoting the small Elite group quite reliably.
This looks like a straightforward story. But consider Figure 3 , which is the same as Figure 2 except with competence parameters altered to pe=0.8 and pm=0.6. There, an interesting twist to that story stands out better. Focus on the curve of circle markers (that is, pooling of the self-assessed Elites only).
The probability of a Mass majority is at its lowest at a group selection competence of about 85%. That suggests that, when only the self-assessed
Elites pool their votes, the Elites benefits most from individuals making occasional mistakes when choosing their group.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The reason lies in the variable sizes of the self-assessed groups. Were group selection competence set to 1, all Elite types would end up in the Elite group and all Mass types in the Mass group, leading to group sizes E and M.
However, if group selection competence is below 1 (but above 0.5) and E < M, we would expect the self-assessed Elite group to be larger than E and the self- Figure 4 , for the case once again of M = 100, E = 21, pe = 0.7 and pm = 0.55.
[ Figure 4 about here] The upshot of our analysis in this section is that our interim conclusions can be robust to the introduction of uncertainty regarding group choice.
There are basically two types of responses to such uncertainty. One is to abstain from practicing epistemic solidarity at all. The other is to take one's chances, practicing epistemic solidarity with whichever group seems most likely to be truly your own but knowing you might be wrong about that. Our analysis suggest that, depending on the parameters, a very substantial proportion of the Masses can abstain in the first way, or be more likely to get it wrong in the second way than the Elites, and our overall conclusion still stands up. Table 4 : Probabilities of a majority for the alternative in the interests of the Masses for different Elite and Mass competence and group sizes, with Elites pooling their votes (based on 10,000 vote simulations each). 
Conclusion

